On the interval Shapley value
OPTIMIZATION, cilt.63, sa.5, ss.747-755, 2014 (SCI-Expanded, Scopus)
- Yayın Türü: Makale / Tam Makale
- Cilt numarası: 63 Sayı: 5
- Basım Tarihi: 2014
- Doi Numarası: 10.1080/02331934.2012.686999
- Dergi Adı: OPTIMIZATION
- Derginin Tarandığı İndeksler: Science Citation Index Expanded (SCI-EXPANDED), Scopus
- Sayfa Sayıları: ss.747-755
- Süleyman Demirel Üniversitesi Adresli: Evet
Özet
The Shapley value is one of the most common solution concepts in Operations Research applications of cooperative game theory. It was defined and axiomatically characterized in different game-theoretic models. In this article, we focus on the Shapley value for cooperative games where the set of players is finite and the coalition values are compact intervals of real numbers. Our main contribution is to characterize the interval Shapley value by using the properties of efficiency, symmetry and strong monotonicity. We also give a characterization by using the interval dividends.