Moore interval subtraction and interval solutions for TU-games
ANNALS OF OPERATIONS RESEARCH, cilt.341, ss.14-29, 2024 (SCI-Expanded, Scopus)
- Yayın Türü: Makale / Tam Makale
- Cilt numarası: 341
- Basım Tarihi: 2024
- Doi Numarası: 10.1007/s10479-024-06265-1
- Dergi Adı: ANNALS OF OPERATIONS RESEARCH
- Derginin Tarandığı İndeksler: Science Citation Index Expanded (SCI-EXPANDED), Scopus, Academic Search Premier, ABI/INFORM, Applied Science & Technology Source, Business Source Elite, Business Source Premier, Computer & Applied Sciences, INSPEC, Public Affairs Index, zbMATH, Civil Engineering Abstracts
- Sayfa Sayıları: ss.14-29
- Süleyman Demirel Üniversitesi Adresli: Evet
Özet
Standard solutions for cooperative transferable utility (TU-) games assign to every player
in a TU-game a real number representing the player’s payoff. In this paper, we introduce
interval solutions for TU-games which assign to every player in a game a payoff interval.
Even when the worths of coalitions are known, it might be that the individual payoff of
a player is not known. According to an interval solution, every player knows at least a
lower- and upper bound for its individual payoff. Therefore, interval solutions are useful
when there is uncertainty about the payoff allocation even when the worths that can be
earned by coalitions are known. Specifically, we consider two interval generalizations of
the famous Shapley value that are based on marginal contributions in terms of intervals.
To determine these marginal interval contributions, we apply the subtraction operator of
Moore. We provide axiomatizations for the class of totally positive TU-games. We also show
how these axiomatizations can be used to extend any linear TU-game solution to an interval
solution. Finally, we illustrate these interval solutions by applying them to sequencing games