A Critical Analysis of the Relationship Between Language-Meaning and Logic in Ludwig Wittgenstein’s Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus
8th International Conference on Social Science Research (ICONSR 2025), Budapest, Macaristan, 28 - 30 Mayıs 2025, ss.121-125, (Tam Metin Bildiri)
- Yayın Türü: Bildiri / Tam Metin Bildiri
- Basıldığı Şehir: Budapest
- Basıldığı Ülke: Macaristan
- Sayfa Sayıları: ss.121-125
- Süleyman Demirel Üniversitesi Adresli: Evet
Özet
Ludwig Wittgenstein examines the relationship between language, meaning and logic in his work Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus. In this study, the connection between language and logic and the way language represents the world are investigated. In the Tractatus, Wittgenstein argues that language’s relationship with reality depicts the world and mentions that this should be put forward in a logical form. Because language points to reality, and logic points to the basic structure of language. Thus, according to Wittgenstein, language reflects reality only with sentences that conform to logical form. In this respect, sentences that carry metaphysical and ethical meanings exceed the limits of language and cannot be described as true or false. Because they have no equivalent in the phenomena in the world. Therefore, discourses that remain outside the limits of reality and language are logically meaningless. Wittgenstein’s views, which he defended in his Tractatus, can be criticized in various contexts. These criticisms usually arise on the grounds that he ignores the more complex and multidimensional structure of language and meaning. In addition, it can be argued that the strict boundaries set by Wittgenstein are insufficient to reflect the actual use of human language. Because, contrary to Wittgenstein, it can be argued that language does not consist solely of meaningful, logical and directly connected sentences with the real world, and that it cannot be spoken of only truth-based or factual forms of expression. For example, emotional, ethical or aesthetic expressions do not have any logical meaning according to Wittgenstein’s way of thinking. However, everyday language contains elements such as metaphors, ambiguities and ambiguities. In addition, Wittgenstein rejects the role of logic in morality and metaphysics in the Tractatus. Because, according to Wittgenstein, morality and metaphysics have no counterparts in the external world. However, the meaning of an ethical principle or a metaphysical problem can often be understood through the forms of expression in language and social contexts, regardless of its truth. In his early period, including his work Tractatus, Wittgenstein argued that the meaning of language is determined by logic and truth, and did not concern himself with the issue of how language functions in social contexts and in the daily experiences of users. However, this view ignores meaningful human experiences outside of language, such as thoughts, emotions, and abstract concepts. In addition to this, the boundaries of language are shaped not only by logic, but also by human perception and experience. Thus, the functionality of language can extend to a wider dimension, structurally and intellectually, compelling people to produce expression and meaning. The meaning of language cannot be determined solely by the issue of being right or wrong. It also depends on its purpose of use, the context in which it occurs, and the ways in which people interact with the world through language. Therefore, language also carries meaning with how it functions in practice, society and interaction. The aim of this study is to develop criticisms of the arguments put forward while Wittgenstein presents the language-meaning and logical relationship in his work Tractatus. In addition, it is aimed to determine the functionality by analyzing the existing criticisms in the context of language-meaning and logical assumptions and to provide possible solutions.
Keywords: Logic, Language, Meaning, Wittgenstein, Tractatus