Some results on cooperative interval games


Gok S. Z.

OPTIMIZATION, cilt.63, ss.7-13, 2014 (SCI İndekslerine Giren Dergi) identifier identifier

  • Cilt numarası: 63 Konu: 1
  • Basım Tarihi: 2014
  • Doi Numarası: 10.1080/02331934.2013.784765
  • Dergi Adı: OPTIMIZATION
  • Sayfa Sayıları: ss.7-13

Özet

Uncertainty is a daily presence in the real world. It affects our decision-making and may have influence on cooperation. On many occasions, uncertainty is so severe that we can only predict some upper and lower bounds for the outcome of our actions, i.e. payoffs lie in some intervals. A suitable game theoretic model to support decision-making in collaborative situations with interval data is that of cooperative interval games. Solution concepts that associate with each cooperative interval game sets of interval allocations with appealing properties provide a natural way to capture the uncertainty of coalition values into the players' payoffs. In this paper, the relations between some set-valued solution concepts using interval payoffs, namely the interval core, the interval dominance core, the square interval dominance core and the interval stable sets for cooperative interval games, are studied. It is shown that the interval core is the unique stable set on the class of convex interval games.