THE MEANING OF METHOD SEARCHES IN THE CONTEXT OF THE CLAIM OF FICTIONALITY OF ARISTOTELIAN LOGIC


Acarer A.

EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF SCIENCE AND THEOLOGY, cilt.21, sa.5, ss.97-112, 2025 (ESCI)

  • Yayın Türü: Makale / Tam Makale
  • Cilt numarası: 21 Sayı: 5
  • Basım Tarihi: 2025
  • Dergi Adı: EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF SCIENCE AND THEOLOGY
  • Derginin Tarandığı İndeksler: Emerging Sources Citation Index (ESCI)
  • Sayfa Sayıları: ss.97-112
  • Süleyman Demirel Üniversitesi Adresli: Evet

Özet

The goal of Aristotelian logic is to produce a method to reach universal and definitive

knowledge. According to this logic system, universal, definitive and unchanging

knowledge can be reached by deduction. According to Aristotle, information obtained

through other methods has an epistemologically weaker information value compared to

information reached by deduction However, philosophers have searched for various

alternative methods throughout the history of science. This has led to the questioning of

the universality of the method of Aristotelian logic. Because this method has sometimes

failed to provide a sufficient answer in reaching the requested information. Thus, together

with deduction, the functionality of Aristotelian logic has also gained a debatable quality.

In this study, deduction, which is the method of Aristotelian logic, will be questioned in

terms of its information value. In addition, the method searches mentioned above and the

basic motivations that gave birth to these searches will be investigated. In addition, the

fictionality of Aristotle’s logic and method will be discussed and the meaning of method

searches will be tried to be determined. Thus, it is aimed to inspection the universal

certainty claim of Aristotle’s logic by comparing it with different method acceptances and

their fictionality. In this context, the study aims to conduct an epistemological discussion

focused on functionality in the light of historical information.

Keywords: logic, Aristotle, method, fictionality, epistemology