Heidegger’s Criticism of Aristotle’s Logic: The Ontological Inquiry of the Principles of Reason
8th International Conference on Social Science Research (ICONSR 2025), Budapest, Macaristan, 28 - 30 Mayıs 2025, ss.203-208, (Tam Metin Bildiri)
- Yayın Türü: Bildiri / Tam Metin Bildiri
- Basıldığı Şehir: Budapest
- Basıldığı Ülke: Macaristan
- Sayfa Sayıları: ss.203-208
- Süleyman Demirel Üniversitesi Adresli: Evet
Özet
This study takes issue with Heidegger’s comprehensive critique of Aristotle’s logic and the way he questions the ontological foundations of the principles of reason. The study questions the historical background of the four classical principles. These principles are identity, non-contradiction, the principle of excluded middle, and Leibniz’s principle of sufficient reason. It is accepted that the line extending from Aristotle to Husserl consolidates logic as a formal-universal truth ground. Heidegger, on the other hand, claims that the “question of being” is ignored; logic is based on a metaphysical acceptance focused on what exists. In the criticism of the principle of identity, it is stated that the formula “A = A” glorifies identity as a static essence, whereas Dasein’s temporal worldly experience offers a dynamic “way of being the same” that always renews identity. It is shown that the principle of non-contradiction forces the phenomenological tensions of being into singular identities; the principle of excluded middle excludes the phenomena of the intermediate field; and the principle of sufficient reason forces the questionability of being into a causal perspective, covering up the hermeneutic plurality of meaning. Heidegger’s objection to these four principles stems from his redefinition of the original task of logos as “aletheia,” the event of revelation. Truth is not conformity or formal correctness as Aristotle’s logic suggests; it is a dimension of experience that emerges in the cycle of latency and openness of being. Thus, logic should not reduce the experience of being; it should take into account Dasein’s modality of being in the world. This study examines the contemporary effects of Heideggerian criticism. In Gadamer’s hermeneutics, the tradition-history line is suggested instead of the universality of logos. Derrida and Deleuze develop difference-centered thoughts by breaking the principles of identity and non-contradiction from a post-structuralist perspective. In the analytical tradition, Hintikka, Dummett and Brandom present models that question classical principles. The common point of these expansions is to historicize the principles of logic by removing them from fixed axioms and to re-functionalize them in a practical linguistic context. On the other hand, Heidegger’s critique is also subject to accusations of irrationalism. It is claimed that the risk of weakening the formal scientific control of logic can legitimize arbitrary decisions in the political arena; Heidegger’s attitudes during his rectorship exemplify this danger. Taking this tension into account, the study argues that logic should neither be seen as a complete instrumentality nor as an absolute discipline of truth. On the contrary, it is adopted that remaining in a productive tension between phenomenological hermeneutics and formal analysis will keep thought alive.
Keywords: Logic, Criticism, The Principles Of Reason, Heidegger, Aristotle.